Introduction and motivation
The widespread wave of currency and financial crises that has affected developed and emerging market economies during the last decade has brought the issue of optimal exchange rate policy back to the forefront of the research agenda in international macroeconomics. In particular, much attention has been given to exits from fixed to flexible exchange rate regimes, their nature, as well as their macroeconomic, financial and institutional determinants. Most empirical studies make use of discrete-choice econometric specifications, whereby the dependent variable takes a value of unity whenever an exit occurs, and zero otherwise.
This paper is about the survival of fixed exchange rate regimes. We argue that the time spent within a given regime is likely to determine the probability that a regime will end. Klein and Marion (1997) and Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003) introduce duration as an explanatory variable in a logit specification. The statistical significance of the attached regression coefficient indicates that time matters, and its sign whether it contributes positively or negatively to the probability of an exit. This approach remains limited on conceptual and analytical grounds and a duration model will be more appropriate.
At a conceptual level duration analysis deals directly with the conditional probability of an event taking place, rather than with its unconditional probability. The key question is:
"What is the probability that a given regime will end at time t + 1, given that it has lasted up to time t?" The natural way of thinking about the probability that a regime will end at some point in the future when we believe that the time spent within the regime affects this same probability is in terms of successive rounds. Suppose that a regime starts in period 1. In period 1, we will consider the probability that the regime will end in period 2. In period 2, we will consider the probability that the regime will end in period 3, conditional on the fact that the regime has lasted up to period 2. In period t > 2, we will consider the probability that the regime will end in period t + 1, conditional on the fact that the regime has lasted up to period t. If we believe that duration is important then the probability of an exit at some point in the future is naturally considered as a sequence of simpler events.
This natural view of the problem emphasizes conditional probabilities, not unconditional ones.
At an analytical level duration models allow for the easy characterization of duration dependence. If we introduce duration as an explanatory variable in a logit regression and look at the sign of the estimated coefficient, the probability of an exit either increases or decreases with duration. In reality, however, there could be a non-monotonic relationship between the probability of an exit and the duration of a regime. It could be that the probability of an exit increases at shorter durations but that it decreases beyond a certain time threshold. Moreover, duration analysis can easily cope with the problem of censoring.
It is likely that some regimes will not be terminated by the end of the sample period. At the time of writing Hong Kong still has a currency board arrangement. Consequently, the observation for Hong Kong will be right-censored. Such observations should be taken into account.
This paper makes use of duration models to study duration dependence across types of countries using the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator. Moreover, we estimate a semi-parametric proportional hazard specification that allows for time-varying independent variables in order to identify the determinants of the probability of an exit. Regime durations are constructed on the basis of the de facto classification of exchange rate regimes proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) .
The results show a clear non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence. The nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator reveals that the relationship between the probability of an exit and the time spent within a regime differs significantly across types of countries. The semi-parametric approach shows that inflation, openness and current account balance affect the conditional probability of an exit. Nevertheless, the pattern of duration dependence remains non-monotonic even after introducing time-varying covariates. In other words, it seems that the probability of an exit from a fixed exchange rate regime is affected by the time spent within this regime, other things being equal.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on exits from fixed exchange rate regimes. Section 3 introduces important concepts for duration analysis and presents the estimation methods. Section 4 deals with the identification of regimes, exits and regime durations. It discusses the various classifications of exchange rate regimes that are available and motivates our particular choice. We also describe the explanatory variables that are included in the estimation of the semi-parametric model. Section 5 provides the results and section 6 concludes.
Review of the literature
Some recent empirical work studies the determinants of exits from fixed exchange rate regimes. These studies differ along several dimensions: exchange rate regime classification, identification of an exit, type of exit, time period, sample of countries, econometric methodology, and explanatory variables.
The source of data varies greatly across studies. In turn, the procedure for the identification of an exit depends largely on the data that are used. Klein and Marion (1997) focus on official end-of-month exchange rates retrieved from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and define an exit as the end of a period during which there exists a particular fixed value of the currency with respect to the U.S. dollar. Tudela (2004) combines data for the nominal exchange rate, the short-term interest rate and international reserves to build an indicator variable of exchange market pressure. In this context, an exit occurs whenever the constructed indicator exceeds a given threshold value, thereby ending a tran- These three studies do not really focus on exits from fixed exchange rate regimes.
The first two are more related to the literature dealing with the determinants of currency crises, along the lines of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), and with the quest for early warning indicators of such crises, such as Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998).
Moreover, as we discuss below, the de facto classification used by Setzer (2004) does not identify regimes properly. Looking at the stability of the exchange rate and other variables over time may identify an exit when some parameter describing the exchange rate regime changes, while the underlying regime remains the same. For example, these studies would capture an exit when the central parity of a target zone arrangement is devalued to a new level. One parameter of the regime changes, but the regime itself has not changed: it is still a target zone! The classification proposed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) Some explanatory variables are significant across most studies: inflation, competitiveness as measured by the evolution of the real exchange rate, and openness.
The vast majority of existing research ignores the issue of censoring systematically, except for those papers using duration models. Suppose that we are focusing on exits between time t 1 and time t 2 . We will observe some exits between t 1 and t 2 without being able to compute the duration when the regime has started before time t 1 . Conversely, some regimes will still be in place after time t 2 , so that we do not observe an exit and are again not able to compute a duration. The literature on duration models recognizes this issue as being very important and proposes ways to take censoring into account. To our knowledge, the studies which include duration as an explanatory variable in a logit framework disregard the problem. Duttagupta and Otker-Robe (2003) exclude incomplete spells explicitly. For example, Hong Kong is excluded from the analysis since its currency board regime is still in place as we write: there is no exit.
Econometric methodology
We define the nonnegative random variable T as the duration (or spell) during which a fixed exchange rate regime is in place 1 . The unconditional probability that the spell will be shorter than some given value t is given by the cumulative distribution function, written as F (t) = P r(T < t). The associated probability density function is written as f (t).
Duration analysis makes use of the reverse cumulative distribution function, referred to as the survivor function, which is written as S(t) = 1 − F (t).
We will estimate the hazard function which captures the conditional probability that the spell will terminate at time T = t, given that it has survived until time t. It is given by
Clearly, both representations in terms of the hazard function and the probability density function contain exactly the same information. However, the hazard function is useful in so far as its shape provides a definition of duration dependence. Positive duration dependence exists at the point t * when dλ(t)/dt > 0 at t = t * . The probability that a regime will end increases as the regime increases in length of time. Conversely, negative duration dependence exists at the point t * when dλ(t)/dt < 0 at t = t * . The condition that dλ(t)/dt = 0 for every t defines a so-called memoryless system. Clearly, it is possible that the hazard function evolves with time in a non-monotonic fashion alternating between positive and negative duration dependence.
There are different approaches to estimating the hazard function. The Kaplan-Meier estimator is a non-parametric approach. The random spell is written as T * in the absence of censoring. The censoring time is C. Then, the observed random variable is T = min(T * , C). Suppose that there are k completed durations in our sample of size n, where k < n since some observations are censored, and because two or more observations can have the same duration. We define a variable δ that takes the value 1 if the observation is censored, and zero otherwise. We assume that if T = t and δ = 1, censoring happens immediately after time T . We can order the completed durations from smallest to largest,
We denote the number of durations that end at time t i by d i , and the number of durations censored between t i and t i+1 by m i . The risk set is the set of durations that are eligible to end at time t i and is defined as
The scalar n i is really the number of durations neither completed nor censored before duration t i . The probability of ending a regime in the interval t + dt given that the spell lasts up to time t is given by
Parametric estimation requires an assumption about the underlying distribution of the random variable T . Suppose that the distribution of durations is known up to a vector of parameters θ. The density of a duration is f (t, θ). The only information available on a censored duration at time t j is that this duration was at least t j . The contribution to likelihood is then given by the value of the survivor function, S(t j , θ). We can again construct a dummy variable δ, taking a value of unity when the observation is censored and zero otherwise. The log-likelihood function is given by
which can be rewritten in terms of the hazard and integrated hazard functions
In practice, the sample of durations is rarely homogeneous and is affected by various explanatory factors. A convenient specification is the proportional hazard (PH) specification which is written as
where x is a vector of explanatory variables, and β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The so-called baseline hazard λ 0 corresponds to the case where φ(.) = 1
and represents the hazard function for the mean individual. Explanatory variables affect the hazard function by multiplying the baseline hazard by a time-invariant factor φ(.).
This specification is convenient for two reasons. First, to the extent that both λ(.) and λ 0 are conditional probabilities, φ(.) will be nonnegative and there is no necessary restriction on the vector of coefficients β. Second, we can interpret the estimated coefficients as the constant proportional effect of x on the conditional probability λ(.).
In many practical applications, the underlying distribution is unknown. However, it is still possible to make no arbitrary assumption about the form of this distribution and resort to semi-parametric estimation. For the sake of the exposition, suppose that all n observations are uncensored. We can order observed durations from smallest to largest, t 1 < ... < t n . The conditional probability that the first observation concludes a spell at time t 1 , given that all of the n durations could have ended at time t 1 , is
This quantity is the contribution of the first observation to partial likelihood. The numerator is the hazard for the individual whose spell completes at time t 1 , while the denominator is the sum of the hazards for individuals whose spells could have ended at time t 1 . If we adopt the specification λ(t, x, β, λ 0 ) = λ 0 (t)φ(x 1 , β) this ratio becomes
Only the order of completed durations provides information on the unknown coefficients. The baseline hazard λ 0 cancels out and therefore, we do not have to make an assumption on its underlying distribution. It is recovered from the partial likelihood estimation. In general, the log-likelihood function is obtained as
We shall proceed in two steps. Firstly, we estimate the hazard function using the non-parametric estimator for the whole sample and sub-samples of the data. This graphical evidence can illustrate differences in duration dependence across types of economies.
Secondly, we make use of a proportional hazard specification to account for time-varying explanatory variables to assess how these affect the conditional probability that a given exchange rate regime will end. Indeed, it may be that the pattern of duration dependence
shown by the non-parametric estimator is explained by the time-varying behaviour of explanatory factors. In the extreme, we could observe that the time spent within a fixed exchange rate regime could have no effect on the conditional probability of an exit, once that the appropriate time-varying factors are taken into account.
Data
The identification of a duration requires the definition of a time origin, a time scale, and an event that ends the duration. We have argued that most studies do not deal with exchange rate regimes but rather with spells of exchange rate stability. Focusing exclusively on the behaviour of the nominal exchange rate or on an index of exchange market pressure may lead us to conclude that a regime changes, when in fact only some parameter describing this regime changes. Therefore, we need a classification of exchange rate regimes that takes this problem into account. We adopt the de facto classification constructed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) . It is available at a monthly frequency over a long time period, avoids identifying short spells of exchange rate stability as regimes, takes account of the fact that countries may have dual or multiple exchange rates, and/or parallel markets, and is not based on official declarations but rather on the actions of monetary authorities.
Exchange rate regime classification

Definition of exits and durations
The time origin for each duration is defined as the first month during which the classification shows any type of a fixed exchange rate regime. We define an exit from a fixed to a flexible did not fail before. This is true for all regimes observed in January 1974, so none of these regimes can have failed before that date. Hence, we would not have any observation to contribute to partial likelihood.
Explanatory variables
The proportional hazard model allows for time-varying explanatory variables. We select these variables on the basis of empirical studies dealing with the determinants of the onset of currency crises, and with the factors underlying the optimal choice of an exchange rate 
Results
This section presents our results in three steps. We start with some descriptive statistics on the computed durations and calculate estimates of the hazard function using the KaplanMeier estimator. Finally, we show the estimates of the proportional hazard model. 2 We discuss the source and measurement of our variables in the appendix.
Descriptive analysis
The full sample between January 1974 and December 2001 yields 87 durations for 58 countries. Fifty-one observations correspond to regimes that have ended before or in December 2001, and the remaining 36 observations are right-censored. We disaggregate this number between developed and emerging economies 3 . Table 1 provides summary statistics (expressed in months) on durations for the two different types of countries. Regimes can last for a very long period of time. Fourteen countries exhibit a fixed exchange rate during our entire sample. Regimes can also be very short, lasting three months. The mean for the full sample of countries equals 140 months, about 12 years.
This number is in line with Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2004), and contradicts previous studies on the evolution of exchange rate regimes. Klein and Marion (1997) report a mean duration of 32 months. The difference reflects the underlying definition of an exchange rate regime. We focus on exchange rate regimes whereas previous studies focus on shortterm exchange rate spells. Moreover, fixed exchange regimes in the developed world last More precisely, it alternates between increasing and decreasing parts. Therefore, duration dependence cannot be qualified as being either positive, or negative: it depends upon survival time. Probit and logit regressions will not be able to capture the effect of duration on the probability of an exit adequately. Furthermore, it remains difficult to provide for an interpretation of such duration dependence. It could arise from the fact that credibility is only gradually achieved after the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime. The conditional probability of an exit would rise initially. Conditional on survival up to a certain time threshold, however, this probability would then start declining.
Non-parametric estimation
Our descriptive analysis shows that regime durations vary across types of countries. Figure 2 estimates separate hazard functions and shows that there are pronounced differences in the shape of the hazard functions depending on country type. Developed economies exhibit almost no duration dependence. Emerging market economies are characterised by a higher hazard function with a non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence. Figure 3 presents estimates of the survivor functions and confirms this evidence. A log-rank test of the equality of survivor functions rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
The bipolar hypothesis of exchange rate regimes claims that in a world of highly integrated financial markets, fixed exchange rate regimes are not sustainable in the long run and will inevitably collapse at some point. In terms of duration dependence, the hypothesis can be interpreted as positive duration dependence. In other words, the conditional probability of an exit will not decrease over time. Our results for emerging markets could suggest that this hypothesis is not supported by the data since a significant portion of the hazard function is decreasing. However, such a conclusion is doubtful for at least two Table 2 presents the results. We report the number of observations and the p-value of a chi-squared test for the overall validity of the model.
The null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly zero is always strongly rejected.
The coefficients for the degree of openness and current account balance are always negative and significantly different from zero. A greater degree of openness to the rest of the world and a stronger current account correspond to a reduced probability of an exit. The coefficient on the rate of inflation is always positive and almost always significant, except when an index of central bank independence is included. A greater degree of governor turnover (less central bank independence) implies an increasing probability of an exit. The fact that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on inflation is zero may be attributed to the well-known relationship between inflation and central bank independence. Economic growth matters weakly in some specifications, while the rate of growth of international reserves remains insignificant in all specifications. Budget balance appears to be significant in two models only. The coefficients on the rate of unemployment is usually significant but carries a surprising negative sign. We would have expected that a greater rate of unemployment would lead policymakers to adopt a floating exchange rate regime, thereby reducing the survival of fixed exchange rate regimes.
Our results show that the conditional probability of an exit is not significantly affected by the presence of capital controls, the occurrence of a banking crisis, the degree of financial development, the overall quality of institutions within the country and the behaviour of the real exchange rate. However, we note that most coefficients on these variables carry the expected sign. For example, the incidence of a banking crisis would correspond to an increased probability of an exit, other things being equal. In general, the baseline specification captures most of country heterogeneity. A dummy variable for an emerging market country is significant at the 10% level only.
Partial likelihood estimation allows for the retrieval of the baseline hazard function. Time would matter whenever the estimated baseline hazard function still remains different from a horizontal line. We leave this issue for further research.
Concluding remarks
This paper studies the conditional probability of an exit from a fixed exchange rate regime.
When we believe that the time spent within a regime is an important determinant of the probability of exiting this regime, the natural view of exits emphasizes conditional probabilities instead of unconditional ones and duration models are an appropriate tool.
We use both non-parametric and semi-parametric techniques to obtain estimates of the hazard functions. The application of the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator uncovers significant non-monotonic patterns of duration dependence that differs across types of countries. To the extent that duration dependence may be driven by time-varying covariates, we also estimate a semi-parametric proportional hazard specification by partial maximum likelihood. Having controlled for macroeconomic, financial and institutional variables, we conclude that the pattern of duration dependence remains non-monotonic.
Therefore, it seems that the time spent within a regime is itself a significant determinant of the probability of an exit.
The issue of duration dependence deserves further investigation. Firstly, the results obtained from the estimation of the proportional hazard specification can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, we can argue that the time spent within a peg matters. On the other hand, we could also claim that we have not controlled for every possible timevarying explanatory factor, so that the pattern of duration dependence persists because of omitted variables. We believe that this problem should be studied further by introducing more explanatory variables, and by taking explicit account of unobserved heterogeneity.
Secondly, this paper aggregates all possible types of fixed exchange rate regimes into a single category. It is doubtful, however, that hard pegs such as dollarization or currency boards exhibit the same properties as soft target zones or even moving bands of fluctuation.
Therefore, the analysis should be refined by disaggregating fixed exchange rate regimes into several categories. In turn, this would increase the number of possible exits between regimes. We could study exits from hard fixing to soft fixing, soft fixing to hard fixing, hard fixing to floating, and soft fixing to floating. In turn, we could also focus on exits from floating regimes. There are several possible combinations of exits and these may exhibit different patterns of duration dependence. Disaggregating across finer categories of exchange rate regimes would also allow for a discussion of the bipolar hypothesis in terms of duration dependence. In this paper, the aggregation of all types of fixing strategies within a single category implies that we can only study one corner solution, the move towards floating exchange rates.
Finally, we have ignored a potential problem of selection bias. Some of the factors that affect the duration of an exchange rate regime may also affect the decision to enter such a regime in the first place. For example, high inflation could possibly lead a country to adopt a rigidly fixed exchange rate within the scope of a broader disinflation strategy.
The evolution of the rate of inflation during the peg will also affect the duration of this arrangement. The study of selection bias in the context of duration models is still in its infancy and we leave this aspect for further investigation.
